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ABSTRACT 
This essay, adapted from the video presentation available at 
http://vimeo.coml89845875, graphically depicts the genealogy and 
evolution of federal civil pleading standards in U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions over time. We show that the standard narrative-of a decline in 
pleading liberality from Conley to Twombly to Iqbal-is complicated by 
both progenitors and progeny. We therefore offer a fuller picture of the 
doctrine of Rule 8 pleading that ought to be of use to judges and 
practitioners in federal court. We also hope to introduce a new visual format 
for academic scholarship that capitalizes on the virtues of narration, 
graphics, mapping, online accessibility, and electronic dissemination. 
* Professor of Law and Harry & Lillian Hastings Research Chair, University of California 
Hastings College of the Law. 
** Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. We thank Tom Rowe for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is now familiar that the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombl/ and Ashcroft v. JqbaP have tightened federal civil pleading 
standards. Courts and commentators reiterate a standard narrative of 
relatively lax liberality from Conley v. Gibson3 for fifty years, suddenly 
tightening with Twombly and Jqbal.4 
We do not dispute the general trend of tightened pleading standards. 
But we believe the simplified picture of the standard narrative is 
incomplete. Other cases, often overlooked, complicate the picture 
considerably. 
We aim to bring those cases and complications to light by graphically 
depicting the genealogy and evolution of civil pleading standards in U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions over time. This essay, written for the print edition, 
is adapted from our unique audio/visual presentation of the topic,S which 
capitalizes on the virtues of narration, graphics, mapping, online 
accessibility, and electronic dissemination. We urge readers to view and 
share the video presentation. 
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
3. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
4. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials 
on the Merits: Rejlections of the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 286, 331-
35 (2013); Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705-10 (11th Cir. 2010). Although we are mindful that 
lower courts have not always followed the liberality of Conley, see Richard L. Marcus, The 
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 
449-50, 492 (1986), we focus here exclusively on the standard as articulated by the Supreme 
Court. 
5. Scott Dodson & Colin Starger, Mapping Supreme Court Doctrine: Civil Pleading, 
VlMEO.COM (Jan. 28, 2014), https:llvimeo.coml84355403. 
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II. THE MAPPING SCHEMA 
For this print version, we incorporate a graphical "doctrinal map" to 
chart pleading doctrine.6 The map plots relationships between Supreme 
Court opinions on an x-y axis. The opinions themselves are represented as 
triangles: Upward-pointing triangles represent cases where pleadings were 
found sufficient (motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) were 
unsuccessful) and downward-pointing triangles represent cases where the 
pleadings were found insufficient (motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b )(6) 
were successful). The x-axis plots the date of an opinion, while the y-axis 
plots the relative liberality of the opinion's pleading standard: the higher on 
the y-axis, the more liberal the pleading standard in that opinion. The map 
also shows-via arrows-the citations of one decision to another, with a 
green arrow representing a favorable citation and a yellow arrow 
representing a critical citation. Figure 1 shows the axes and legend: 
How tb~e Map Works 
'983 .... '1193 2002 2005 2007 May 2007 Jun 2m:I 2011..tan 2011 Mat 
FIGURE 1 
6. Our use of "doctrinal maps" grows out of earlier work by one of us in this field. See, 
e.g., Colin Starger, Exile on Main Street: Competing Traditions and Due Process Dissent, 95 
MARQ. L. REv. 1253 (2012); Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in 
the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 77 (2012); Colin Starger, A 
Visual Guide to United States v. Windsor: Doctrinal Origins of Justice Kennedy's Majority 
Opinion, 108 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 130 (2013). 
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III. THE SIMPLE PLEADING NARRATIVE 
In this Part, we map the pleading narrative that dominates court 
opinions and commentary. As we hope to show in a later Part, this narrative 
is overly simplistic. 
Before plotting the decisions themselves, we must layout the 
backdrop of federal civil pleading. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure states that a plaintiffs complaint need only set out "a short and 
plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.,,7 
The seminal case on Rule 8 is Conley v. Gibson, which interpreted 
Rule 8 merely to require a complaint to give the defendant "fair notice" of 
the plaintiffs claim "and the grounds upon which it rests."g Conley 
famously stated that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.,,9 
Conley thus set a very liberal standard for pleading a civil claim. 10 As 
long as the claimant pleads a legally recognizable claim and includes 
enough facts to provide notice to the defendant, the claim should satisfy 
Rule 8." 
The Court decided two important cases after Conley-Leatherman v. 
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination UnU l2 and 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA.13 Each case unanimously reaffirmed and 
restated the liberal Conley standard and disapproved of lower courts 
attempting to set a stricter pleading standard for certain kinds of cases. 14 
In 2007, however the Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,15 
which abrogated Conley's "no set of facts" standard and held that the 
plaintiff must go beyond mere notice to state a claim for relief that is 
"plausible.,,16 Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,17 the Court confirmed 
7. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2). Other rules and statutes can require different pleading 
standards for specific kinds of claims. See, e.g., FED. R. Cry. P. 9(b) (fraud), but because we focus 
on the general pleading standard of Rule 8, we do not address unique pleading standards here. 
8. 355 U.S. at 47. 
9. [d. at 45-46. 
10. [d. 
II. See SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY 26-30 (2013). 
Many have criticized the liberality of Conley. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No 
Secrets are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1665, 1685 (1998). 
12. 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
13. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
14. See DODSON, supra note 11, at 35-37. 
15. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
16. [d. at 556-57,562-63. 
17. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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Twombly's plausibility standard and further tightened pleadings by 
directing courts to disregard conc1usory allegations. 18 Figure 2 below plots 
these cases. 
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FIGURE 2 
Figure 2 depicts the conventional narrative of pleadings standards at the 
Supreme Court level. The chart shows an unadulterated liberality from 
Conley to Swierkiewicz with all upward-pointing triangles at the high end of 
the liberality axis, suddenly sliding down to a stricter pleading standard 
imposed by the downward-pointing triangles of Twombly and Iqbal. 
Twombly, by instituting a new "plausibility" hurdle, is plotted significantly 
lower on the y-axis liberality scale. Iqbal, with its rigid, transsubstantive 
application of plausibility, plus its insistence that conc1usory allegations be 
disregarded, is plotted even lower. 19 
18, Id at 678-80. 
19. We understand that "liberality" is both relative and subjective. However, we believe 
the basic slide in liberality depicted here is widely accepted. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, 
Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. 849, 872-73 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, 
Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REv. 821, 823 (2010); Miller, supra note 4, at 331-38; A. 
Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 353,353-
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Note that, although Twombly cited to Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, it 
also called them into question because both of those cases relied heavily 
and largely on Conley.20 Accordingly, we have colored those arrows yellow. 
Interestingly, as the map shows, Iqbal did not even cite directly to Conley, 
Leatherman, or Swierkiewicz. 
The most visually arresting takeaway from the map, however, is the 
standard narrative: a consistent adherence to the liberal Conley pleading 
standard, marked by a fairly dramatic slide to Twombly and Iqbal, with 
neither case following other prior precedent. 
IV. COMPLICATING THE MAP 
We hope to complicate this picture a bit by" attending to Twombly's 
progenitors and progeny. We do not dispute the general trend: pleading 
standards have, at least at the Supreme Court level of doctrine, tightened. 
But there is more to this story than just Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal. 
To begin with, Twombly did not create stricter pleading out of whole cloth. 
Twombly relied on three other pleadings decisions for support. 
In the first, Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State 
Council ojCarpenters,21 although the Court found the conduct alleged may 
have been unlawful-the claim was "insufficient as a matter oflaw,,22-the 
Court opined that if the conduct had been unlawful, then a district court 
could "insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a 
potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.'.23 
In the second, Papasan v. Allain/4 a case challenging wealth disparities 
in public education, the plaintiffs alleged that the disparities deprived 
schoolchildren of a minimally adequate education.25 The Court disregarded 
this allegation because, the Court said, such an allegation with "no actual 
54, 359 (2010); Fowler v. UPMC Shadywide, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) ("[P]leading 
standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of 
pleading .... "). But see Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 
1344-45 (2010) (making the case that Twombly and Iqbal are consistent with Conley and its 
progeny). 
20. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("A court may dismiss a 
complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be 
proved consistent with the allegations." (emphasis added)); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1993) (rejecting the need for factual 
specificity under Rule 8 beyond mere notice); cf Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 ("[B]ecause Conley has 
been specifically repudiated by both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar 
as it concerns pleading requirements and relies on Conley."). 
21. 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
22. /d. at 545. 
23. Id.at527n.17. 
24. 478 U.S. 265 (1986). 
25. Id. at 273-74. 
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facts" alleged in support was merely "a legal conclusion couched as a 
factual allegation.,,26 
In the third, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,27 the Court held that 
a plaintiff pleading federal securities fraud must allege some factual 
description of the economic loss and its causal connection.28 Otherwise, the 
Court predicted, "a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim" could force an 
unjust settlement without "a reasonably founded hope that the discovery 
process will reveal relevant evidence.,,29 
Instead of Leatherman or Swierkiewicz, Twombly relied on each of 
these three cases to justify its doctrinal conclusion. Twombly cited Papasan 
to disregard the allegation of a conspiracy as merely a legal conclusion.30 
And, citing Associated General and Broudo, Twombly emphasized the need 
for additional facts before allowing a claim without a reasonably founded 
hope of evidentiary support to impose discovery costs or force an unjust 
settlement.3! Figure 3 below shows the complications of the progenitors of 
Twombly. 
26. Id. at 286. 
27. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
28. See id. at 346. 
29. Id. at 347 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 
(1975)). Although federal statutory law sets a specific pleading standard for certain elements of 
securities fraud, the Court analyzed the pleading issue in Broudo under Rule 8(a)(2). 
30. Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 
U. S. 265,286 (1986)). 
31. Id. at 557-62. 
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In addition to these oft-overlooked early cases, there is a blip in the 
middle. Erickson v. Pardus,32 decided just after Twombly, seemed to apply 
a more lenient pleading standard to a pro se prisoner suit,33 which is why 
Figure 4 below plots it higher up on the y-axis. But, in that case, the 
allegations easily satisfied even Twombly's plausibility standard. And pro 
se plaintiffs are historically given some leniency in pleading?4 Further, 
Iqbal, the case right after Erickson, continued the downward trend in 
pleading liberality, and it relied heavily on Twombly without even 
mentioning Erickson. In fact, Erickson has not been cited by any other 
opinion in our map. As Figure 4 shows, Erickson is just a red herring. 
32. 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 
33. Id.at93-94. 
34. SeeDODSON,supranote 11,at61-62. 
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The final complication that we introduce to the map comprises the post-
Iqbal cases, which seem to show a bit of genuine uptick in pleading 
liberality. 
In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,35 a unanimous Court 
reaffirmed the plausibility-pleading standard of Twombly and Iqbal but 
nevertheless held that the relatively bare allegations satisfied that 
standard.36 And, in Skinner v. Switzer/7 the Court favorably cited 
Swierkiewicz (and did not cite Twombly or IqbaT) in upholding the 
complaint.38 Figure 5-the final map-adds these cases. 
35. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011). 
36. Id. at l322-23. 
37. 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011). 
38. Id. at 1296. 
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These cases do not retract the Twiqbal standard-to the contrary, their 
language tends to entrench it-but they do offer data points that could be 
seen as less strict. All told, then, our map shows a more complicated-and 
perhaps quite unfinished-picture of civil pleading standards as set out by 
the Supreme Court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this very brief essay, we have graphically mapped civil pleading 
standards as articulated by the Supreme Court. We hope readers will view, 
and share, the more accessible video presentation from which this written 
essay is adapted. In the meantime, we look forward to the Court's next 
pronouncement. 
